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THE ASSESSMENT OF POLLUTION DAMAGE TO
AQUATIC RESOURCES: ALTERNATIVES TO THE
TRIAL MODEL
Richard A. Du Bey*
Eugene R. Fidell**
INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, Aldo Leopold remarked in The Land
Ethic that "[o]ne basic weakness in a conservation system
based wholly on economic motives is that most members of the
land community have no economic value." 1 Mr. Leopold's generalization is probably equally applicable to aquatic resources.
It is fair to say that for the most part, no economic value has
been fixed for the resources which comprise the aquatic community. The primary reason for this apparent shortcoming is
that it is no easy thing to place a price tag on the environment.
In the last several years, attention has properly focused on
the so-called superfund legislation that has led a "perils of
Pauline" existence on Capitol Hill for some time,2 recently in
the form of Senate bill 2083.1 However, it -must be understood
© 1979 by Richard A. Du Bey and Eugene R. Fidell.
* B.B.A., 1968, University of Miami; J.D., 1975, New England School of Law;
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Environmental Studies, University of Washington.
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1. A. LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE
AND THERE

210 (1949).

2. S. 684, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S2882 (daily ed. March 15, 1979);
S. 2900, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S5397 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1978); S. 687,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rac. S2484 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1977); S. 1187, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S5134 (daily ed. March 30, 1977); S. 2083, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6803, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H3904 (daily ed.May
2, 1977); S. 1754, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. S8278 (daily ed. May 15, 1975);
S. 2162, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. S13262 (daily ed. July 22, 1975).
The Carter administration was responsible for the introduction of S.1187, and has
taken other steps to control oil pollution. See Oil Pollution of the Oceans: President's
Message to Congress Recommending Measures to Control the Problem, 13 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 408 (March 18, 1977).
3. S. 2083, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (as amended).
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that the economic concern identified by Mr. Leopold will not
be cured by the "superfund" unless that fund is administered
in a manner that recognizes and addresses the valuation problem. In short, no amount of compensation funding in the public
till under current law can guarantee that those dollars will flow
to those who are in fact injured by water pollution.4
Society still insists that liability be predicated on causation, if not always on fault. It is questionable whether it is
possible to ensure that compensation funds flow to the proper
recipient under the present trial model. One obstacle to the
flow of such funds arises from the litigative difficulty of proving
damages in pollution cases. Our legal tradition requires, in
general, that damages be gauged in dollars and cents, although
this may not be a meaningful criterion in each case. The basic
question remains whether a dollar value can be assigned to
particular kinds of environmental injury.' This valuation process must be conducted in a way that is not arbitrary, that is
procedurally fair, that provides reasonable nationwide uniformity, that is sensitive to the subtleties of sophisticated biology and economics, and that reduces the costs and uncertainty
of environmental litigation.
A related shortcoming in the legal framework of natural
resource damage assessment is the lack of scientific baseline
data from which to measure environmental change. This shortcoming may be cured to the extent that natural resource damage assessment can be performed in advance of a spill incident.
Whether pre-spill assessment can be performed turns on practical and political questions such as funding, agency responsibility, and applicable legislation. Senate bill 2083, which
passed the Senate at the end of the 95th Congress, represented
4. See generally Swan, Approaches to Oil Pollution Responsibility, 50 ORE. L.
REv. 503 (1971); Bergman, No Fault Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 5 J. MAR. L.
& CoM. 1 (1973); Doud, Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Further Comment
on the Civil Liability & Compensation Fund Conventions, 4 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 525
(1973); Wood, Toward Compatible Internationaland Domestic Regimes of Civil Liability for Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, V ENVT'L L. REP. (ENVT'L LAW INST.) 50116
(1975); Wood, Requiring Polluters to Pay for Aquatic Natural Resources Destroyed by
Oil Pollution, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAw 545 (1976); Comment, Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act: How Super is the "Superfund"?, 1978 DET. C.
L. REv. 277; Comment, Assessment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Water Pollution:

A Proposalfor Shifting the Burden of Proof Regarding Damages, 30 Hastings L.J. 651
(1979); Comment, Compensation for Oil Pollution at Sea: An Insurance Approach, 12
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 717 (1975).
5. See 7 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS app. VIII, at 19-20 (June, 1978).
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a first and rather rough attempt to answer these questions. The
implication of the bill is that as much biological research as
possible should be performed before pollution incidents occur.
Both the Clean Water Act of 1977 and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 19781 call for the recovery of
the costs of clean-up and restoration or replacement of damaged resources and illustrate the need for basic research on the
consequences of expanding industrial use of the marine environment.'
To be sure, the information to be established as baseline
data cannot be gathered completely before a spill has occurred,
but much preliminary work can be done. In order for such data
to be of maximum utility the results should then be subjected
to examination and review in a forum that will have the attention of the public, that will presumably be adequately funded,
and that will be free of the need to function under the emergency conditions that typically arise after the spill occurs.
Some of the practical aspects of implementing alternative
programs to accomplish natural resource valuation and damage assessment will be discussed in this article. The article first
examines the existing body of law regarding the matter of damage assessment, and then explores the probable consequences
of implementing a natural resource assessment scheme that
would be based on established natural resource damage assessment procedures and valuation tables. It then considers
whether a valuation scheme established by rule-making can be
6. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (West 1978).
7. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372,
92 Stat. 629.
8. Section 208 of the 1978 Amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act provide for the development of baseline environmental studies for both existing
and prospective lease sale areas. Id. § 208 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1346). In
addition, § 208 directs the Secretary of the Interior to monitor the marine environment
and provide time series and data trend information to be used "for the purpose of
identifying any significant changes in the quality and productivity of such environments, for establishing trends in the areas studied and monitored, and for designing
experiments to identify the causes of such changes." Id. § 208 (to be codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1346(b)). Furthermore, the Secretary is granted specific a ithority to cancel
at any time any lease or permit where continued operation "will probably cause serious
harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property . . . or to
the marine coastal, or human environment ....
" Id. § 204'(to be codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i)). However, for the Secretary to exercise this power two additional tests must be met. These are that "[the] threat of harm or damage will not
disappear or decrease to an acceptable extent within a reasonable period of time; and
the advantages of cancellation outweigh the advantages of continuing such lease or
permit in force." Id. § 204 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii)).
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a more desirable means of assessing resource values than the
current case-by-case method. It is concluded that regardless of
the particular path finally chosen, the matter requires much
closer sustained attention than it has received in the past.
DEVELOPMENT OF NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES IN AQUATIC RESOURCE
VALUATION

Common Law Judicial Valuation
Assuming that natural resources have an economic value,
to be confronted is the determination of that
problem
the
value. A novel and troublesome case that fixed damages for the
loss of natural resources was decided in 1978 in Puerto Rico.
9
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni involved
a discharge of 1.5 million gallons of oil off the coast of Puerto
Rico in 1973, resulting in damage to a mangrove swamp on the
island. The decision sets a remarkable and controversial precedent with respect to the valuation and assessment of natural
resource damages.
In The Zoe Colocotroni, Puerto Rico, as trustee for its resources, submitted a biological damage survey as evidence to
be used in calculating recovery. This survey multiplied a representative number of dead organisms per square meter of biosystem by a dollar amount equal to the cost of replacement. The
court granted relief on several counts, including over $75,000 in
cleanup costs, and more than half a million dollars for pollution
damage to twenty-three acres of mangrove swamp. The latter
figure included replanting, monitoring, and fertilizing expenses. However, the largest recovery was awarded for damage to
the marine organisms in an area of about twenty acres in and
around the swamp. The court accepted evidence that
there was a decline of approximately 4,605,486 organisms
per acre as a direct result of the oil spill. This means that
92,109,720 marine animals were killed by the COLOCOTRONI oil. The uncontradictedevidence establishes that
there is a ready market with reference to biological supply

laboratories,thus allowing a reliable calculation of the cost
of replacing these organisms. The lowest possible replacement cost figure is $.06 per animal, with many species

selling from $1.00 to $4.50 per individual. Accepting the
lowest replacement cost, and attachingdamages to the lost
9.

456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978), a/I'd, No. 78-1542 (1st Cir. June 29, 1979).
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marine animals in the West Mangrove area, we find the
damages caused by Defendants to amount to
$5,526,583.20. [Emphasis added.]"
What is to be made of such a judgment? Does inclusion of
every microorganism, no matter how small its contribution to
the overall ecosystem, seem appropriate when we consider the
six cent price tag? Alternatively, if the district court had before
it a full, rigorous scientific and economic record on these matters, should the damage assessment process be rerun in the
event there is another oil spill? If a generic question has been
addressed in the case, is there not a measure of unfairness to
other parties whose monetary liability may be affected, but
who have not had a hand in the procedures used, the record
made, or the result reached?
A central shortcoming of the present institutional framework for compensating parties adversely affected by oil and
hazardous materials spills is the litigative burden of showing
the monetary damage caused by such injury. Each claimant
must prove individual damages - a task that is costly, time
consuming, and inherently uncertain. Even for the public
claimant with plentiful technical and legal assistance, such as
the federal or state governments, this shortcoming may present
serious problems;" even less tolerable are the problems that
confront the smaller public claimant or the private claimant.
10. Id. at 1344-45 (footnote omitted).
11. This is exactly the problem that now confronts the federal or state plaintiff
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95372, 92 Stat. 629. Title III of the 1978 Amendments establishes an Offshore Oil Spill
Pollution Fund which recognizes as one element of the damage claim "injury to, or
destruction of, natural resources .... "Id. § 303(a)(2)(C) (to be codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1813(a)(2)(C)). However, the Coast Guard has stated that for such a public plaintiff
to be successful in asserting its claim as a "trustee" of natural resources, it must
establish:
(1) The identification and quantity of the natural resource for which
compensation is claimed;
(2) The nature and extent of the injury to the natural resource;
(3) The cost to restore or replace the natural resource; and
(4) Any economic loss relating to the natural resource which would not
be recovered by replacement or restoration.
44 Fed. Reg. 16,874 (1979) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 136.115(a)).
To establish such a claim on a case-by-case basis is a substantial burden on
plaintiffs even with the benefit of monies provided by the fund for conducting damage
assessment activities under § 302(c)(2) of the 1978 Amendments. Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 302(c)(2), 92 Stat. 629
(to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1812). Uniform damage assessment procedures and
valuation methods would ease this burden.
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Defendants in spill cases also have an obvious interest in the
matter, in both keeping recoveries at realistic levels and in
providing limits in order to obtain insurance protection at reasonable cost.
There are alternatives to the adjudication of organism values as exemplified by The Zoe Colocotroni. Under proper procedural safeguards, such alternatives could serve to alleviate
some of the hardship that a complex and lengthy case-by-case
determination of resource values is likely to entail." A preestablished table of values is one option to be considered for use
in conjunction with pre-established research protocols and economic methodologies for conducting the valuation phase of the
resource damage assessment investigation. Such a natural resource valuation process and a damage assessment scheme
were elements of the legislation that passed the Senate in
1978.'1
The issue then, is whether there is a way to streamline this
process by developing "neutral principles" for conducting a
post-spill damage assessment and, if possible, for assigning a
conventional dollar value to environmental injuries associated
with a spill. But can such things be precisely valued? Fair nonjudicial methods of valuation are possible and should be given
serious consideration. 4
Specific Conventional Values as Guidelines
Assuming that the judicial trial model of damage assessment is typified by The Zoe Colocotroni, it is suggested that
there are other means available to conduct natural resource
damage assessment that may be more attractive from the
standpoints of improved predictability, economy of administration, and scientific rigor. One technique that has been considered is the development of specific conventional "dollar"
values as guidelines to control the compensation of injured
parties. If established in advance of a particular damage incident such values can improve the probability of fair and in12. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 519 (1977). Professor
Rodgers states that "[s]uccess in a law suit for oil spill damage is complicated by
predictable barriers - finding a defendant and overcoming subtle causation and burden of proof problems." Id.
13. See 124 CONG. REc. S17,435-55 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978); id. H12,731-42 (daily
ed. Oct. 12, 1978).
14. See generally Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Oceans & Atmosphere, Workshop
on Oil Spill Damage Assessment (July 17, 1978)(unpublished transcript).
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formed settlements in lieu of litigation. Moreover, such values

would have a more sound technical basis in as much as the
research underlying the valuation would be performed under
less hectic conditions than usually obtain in the wake of a
major pollution incident. In practice, there is little information
regarding either the application of conventional values to or the
utility of fixed resource values for damage assessment litigation. However, a variety of analogous approaches, private, federal, and state, do exist where specific conventional values
have been established for various legally recognized injuries
andthus merit further exploration.
Private Approaches. There have been several attempts to
assign economic dollar values to particular forms of wildlife.' 5
For example, the Pollution Abatement Committee of the
Southern Division of the American Fisheries Society (AFS) has
published a pamphlet entitled Monetary Values of Fish, in
which the 1975 revision opens with the claim that "[e]very
fish has a value."''
The AFS listing may be faulted on the ground that it was
apparently based only on a survey of average prices charged by
commercial fish hatcheries. Although hatchery prices may be
an imperfect guide to values, the fact that AFS has produced
this guide suggests that society need not "reinvent the wheel"
in each damage assessment situation. Fortunately, the AFS is
presently undertaking further regional and nationwide efforts
along the same lines.'"
Nevertheless, numerous questions remain. How often
must the values be revised to reflect the impact of inflation?
Are per-fish or per-pound values useful without also taking into
account the mortality of hatchery fish versus naturally propa15. See generally Comptroller Gen. of the United States, GAO Comptroller General's Report B-146335, Total Cost Resulting From Two Major Oil Spills (June, 1977).
This report was prepared at the request of the late Rep. Leo J. Ryan, Chairman, House
Government Operations Committee, in connection with hearings regarding the National Contingency Plan.
16. AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y, So. Div., POLL. ABATEMENT COMM., MONETARY VALUES
oF FiSH (1975).
17. In 1977, the Monetary Values of Fish Committee of the North Central division of the AFS approved a report entitled 1978 Reimbursement Values for Fish. The
committee relied chiefly on hatchery production costs, commercial values, and angler
expenditures, but recommended consideration of a variety of other factors in addition
to the "actual value of the fish themselves." AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y, NORTH CENTRAL DIV.,
MONETARY VALUES OF FISH COMM.,

1978 REIMBURSEMENT VALUES FOR FISH (1977). A

nationwide AFS committee is scheduled to begin work in 1979 on a single publication
to cover all AFS regions.
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gated fish? Additionally, the costs of transportation, stock assessment, and restocking must also be revised. Is it necessary
to consider both hatchery prices and commercial fish prices, at
least for food fish for which a market exists? How shall we treat
special cases such as endangered species?
This AFS table has been cited in connection with the preparation of benefit-cost analyses under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,11 and has been used at trial by the
9
Virginia State Water Control Board,' even though it is not
definitive and has no independent legal status. It should also
be noted that the State of Florida has adopted by regulation a
'
table of fish values comparable to the AFS table. "
Federal Approaches. Another approach is evident in the
Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related
Resources promulgated by the Water Resources Council in
1973.21 Under those guidelines, an effort is made to assign perday value to recreational activities including recreational fishing. The guidelines divide outdoor recreation into two categories: the "general" category, which is said to include a value
range of 75 cents to $2.25, and the "specialized" category,
which is assigned a daily value range of $3.00 to $9.00. The
difference between the two categories may be difficult to define, but one may be tempted to invoke, by analogy, Mr. Jus2 2tice Stewart's celebrated dictum concerning obscenity
namely, that, however, difficult it is to define a specialized
form of recreation, one nonetheless knows it when one sees
it.23

How useful are the Water Resources Council guidelines?
Aside from inflation occurring since 1973, both categories of
fishing-general and specialized-provide only a range of values, indeed a range where the ceiling is three times the mini18.
U.S.

42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970); see, e.g., 1 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT RELATED TO OP-

ERATION OF INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT UNIT No. 3, at XI-63 (Feb., 1975).

19. E.g., Commonwealth ex. rel. State Water Control Bd. v. Weaver Mirror Co.,
Law No. 4722 (Franklin County, Va., Cir. Ct., June 2, 1977).
20. See notes 16, 17 supra.
21. 38 Fed. Reg. 24,778 (1973).
22. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. Along related lines, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) has completed a study analyzing the economics of marine recreational fishing.
NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

ASSOCIATED WITH MARINE RECREATIONAL FISHING (NOAA SIT 78-129) (June, 1977). The
stated purpose is to estimate the economic contribution that marine recreational fishing makes to the national economy.
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mum. For a claimant or a putative defendant in a major pollution case a potential recovery range of 3:1 is rather broad, although even this kind of uncertainty would be an improvement
over the present case-by-case basis of resource valuation and
damage assessment.
Two additional observations concerning the Water Resources Council guidelines should be noted, one procedural and
one substantive. First, the guidelines were developed through
the rulemaking process provided under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).2 4 Thus, they were first issued in proposed
form and subsequently followed by extensive study, review,
field testing, public hearings, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement. The public participation in this
type of rulemaking may provide a model for future generic
actions with respect to resource damage assessment valuation
problems.
The second observation is that even if a two-category
breakdown may not do perfect justice to the variety of economic values at issue in marine pollution valuation efforts, the
notion of a ceiling is an important concept. It is submitted that
no system of compensation should recompense those whose
outlays are patently unreasonable. 5
Under an initiative announced by President Carter on
June 6, 1978, the Water Resources Council Principles and
Standards are to be revised. In particular, the President has
directed the Council "to prepare a manual which ensures that
benefits and costs are calculated using the best techniques and
provides for consistent application of the Principles and Standards and other requirements. ' ' Perhaps the Administration's
initiative with respect to the Principles and Standards will
produce further refinement in the area of natural resource valuation.
24. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1976).
25. The fact that fishermen spent nearly $65.00 per fish pursuing
them in the sport fishery does not justify charging that amount in fishkill
damage claim since the individual's right to enjoy the recreational and
aesthetic aspects of fishing has not been abridged. . . .Although the
average (Washington salmon or steelhead) fisherman is willing to spend
$65.00 on goods and services and the recreational fringe benefits that go
with catching one fish, he is not willing to pay that price for the fish alone.
Neither should the violator be required to pay such an exorbitant fee per
fish in a fishkill damage claim.
STATE OF WASH., DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING FiSHKILL
DAMAGES AND
COMPUTING FISHKILL DAMAGE CLAIMS IN WASHINGTON STATE 19 (1972).

26. Presidential Message No. 182, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S8679,
S8680 (daily ed. June 7, 1978). 44 Fed. Reg. 30, 247 (1979).
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The scientific community should be aware of developments such as these not only because they will have an impact
on federal construction projects, but also because they may
have an important, albeit indirect, effect on other aspects of
government decision-making: for example, the issuance of licenses for various private projects that require federal or state
approval. Of course, whether it is proper to apply the Principles
and Standards in this broader field will be a function of the
rigor of the data that go into their formulation, the existence
of substantive authority that would make them legally applicable, and the sufficiency of the procedures used for their formulation.
State Approaches. Damage assessment schemes in Virginia, California, Washington, and Florida provide a range of
approaches to the matter of natural resources valuation. Although, none of the state schemes is as extensive as the proposed national program, each of the state programs illustrates
a potential element of the proposed national scheme.
Responsibility for natural resource damage assessment in
Virginia regarding fish kills rests with the State Water Control
Board. The Virginia Code empowers the Board to recover costs
incurred by the state in investigating the cause of a fish kill
incident, as well as replacement costs representing the value of
the fish destroyed." Although the term "replacement values"
is not statutorily defined and no official table of values has
been promulgated, the Virginia courts have accepted the AFS
tables of fish values based on hatchery replacement costs as
approximate values."
The State of Washington also employs a system of valuation, but this system does not have the force of law. The Washington State Department of Ecology has published a document
entitled Guidelines for Evaluating Fishkill Damages and Computing Fishkill Damage Claims in Washington State. 9 In general, the Washington guidelines establish the value of fish
killed as either the hatchery price or the cost of hatchery
rearing of the size and type of fish lost. However, the primary
thrust of the Washington guidelines is not natural resource
valuation per se, but rather to provide a methodology for assessing physical resource damage in the field. Moreover, the
27.
28.
29.

VA. CODE § 62.1-44.15(11)(a) (1973).

See note 19 supra.
See note 25 supra.
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emphasis is placed on documentation and presentation of evi30
dence for subsequent litigation purposes.
Although an established schedule of natural resource values is desirable, there are a number of problems associated
with valuation systems based on hatchery replacement costs
such as those used by Virginia and Washington. These problems include the lack of values for non-hatchery species (especially marine species); the lack of compensation for the disproportionate mortality, if this occurs, when hatchery fish are put
into 'an unprotected environment; the special case of rare or
endangered species; and dollar valuations that may not adequately reflect the market value of either sport or commercial
fishing.3'
California's experience regarding natural resource damage
assessment has been extensive, due in large part to the 1969
Santa Barbara oil spill. The California scheme, like those of
Virginia and Washington, is neither statutory nor regulatory
but rests instead upon a provision of the California State Constitution. Article 4, section 2 of the California Constitution
directs the state legislature to provide for the protection of fish
and game.3" The state legislature has delegated this responsibility to the California Fish and Game Commission. California,
in contrast to Virginia and Washington, employs an aggressive,
but essentially ad hoc valuation scheme based in part on differing values for resources in different geographical areas.3" The
state's valuation position is reflected in a categorization of resource damage and settlement positions, but ultimately relies
on the inherent threat to litigate the issue of damages in the
appropriate court of law. 3' California alleviates some of the
artificiality associated with hatchery replacement costs by recognizing that resource values may differ according to location
within a single jurisdiction.
30. For an illustration of the use of the Washington guidelines, see Complaint
for Resource Damage Recovery, State v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., No. 19508
(Pacific County, Wash., Super. Ct., filed Aug. 8, 1978) (claiming (a) sport and commercial fishery losses, (b) restocking costs, and (c) repropagation costs (the values of
the adults that would have matured and spawned, had the kill not occurred)).
31. See generally Macbeth, Measure of Damages in Fishkill Cases, Envir. Cont.
Newsletter (Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen.), Nov. 8, 1974, at 14.
32. CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
33. See generally Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Oceans & Atmosphere, Workshop
on Oil Spill Damage Assessment 98-111 (July 17, 1978) (remarks of Edwin Dubiel, Cal.
Dep't of Justice).
34. Id.
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Apparently only Florida has adopted a valuation system
by regulation. By legislative mandate,3 5 the State Department
of Pollution Control has promulgated tables of fish values that
are published in the Florida Administrative Code.3 The methodology for establishing the resource valuation tables is not
specifically provided for by statute, although it appears that
the tables may have been based at least in part on the AFS
model.3 Of course, the Florida tables have a distinct advantage
over the materials used by other states in that they have the
force of law: in a judicial or administrative proceeding where
natural resource damages are in issue, the Florida table enjoys
a presumption of validity unless credible evidence to the contrary is introduced. Other states' valuation schemes must be
established as valid evidence in each proceeding in which they
are employed.
Even though adopted by regulation, the Florida resource
values are only presumptively valid since the Florida Supreme
Court has held that to make values conclusive would result in
a denial of the right to present evidence, a violation of due
process of law. The defendant's right in a spill case to present
evidence was established in Department of Pollution Control
v. International Paper Company," where the statute permitting damages to be assessed by reference to a table of resource
values for individual species of fish was challenged as a violation of constitutional protections. The Florida court held that
establishing statutorily authorized fish values was a proper
exercise of the police power and that the tables were relevant
to the question of damages. The court also held that the manner of determining values may be statutorily established and
presumed as fact unless credible evidence to the contrary is
introduced by either party. The decision adopts this statutory
construction so as to avoid the more difficult issue that would
arise if the legislature's intent to make the presumption conclusive had been shown more clearly.
As a practical matter, adoption of a natural resource valuation table as a regulation may be expected to give rise to a
35.

36.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.141(3)
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ch. 17-11.

(West Supp. 1979).

37. See Letter from R.L. Caleen, Jr., General Counsel, Fla. Dep't of Environmental Regulation, to authors (June 23, 1978) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
Significantly, it appears that the Florida authorities conducted an evidentiary (trialtype) rulemaking proceeding before the table of values regulation was promulgated.

Id.
38.

329 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976).

1979]

POLLUTION DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

rebuttable presumption as to the accuracy of the valuation
scheme thus created.3 9 That is, once it is established that damage has occurred and causation has been shown, a prima facie
case exists and the dollar values of the damaged resources are
presumed to be those set out in the valuation tables. Even with
a clearly rebuttable presumption, however, important questions remain. Should the government be allowed in a particular
case to exceed the value shown in the regulation? And if a party
challenges the established value and presents some evidence
for this purpose, does the presumption disappear? If the presumption disappears, would values need to be established
"from scratch," and would both parties thus be restored to
their original positions?
The existence of the various state schemes discussed above
shows that the problem of resource valuation has been recognized and that attempts have been made to confront it. However, thus far, the state schemes appear to be less than ideal
in providing reliable, fair, and inexpensive methods for determining the value of damaged natural resources.
It may be necessary in some cases to establish values based
on criteria other than hatchery replacement costs. Moreover, it
is essential that the evidentiary status of any such damage
assessment and valuation guidelines be defined by statute.
This would eliminate or at least reduce the burden of proving
the value of the damaged resources in each proceeding, since
conventional values would have been established in advance of
the spill. Since priorities are such that the vast majority of
states are not capable of preparing extensive damage assessment plans prior to the occurrence of a pollution incident, federal funding would probably have to be made available if such
a program were to be pursued. The Oil Spill Compensation
"superfund" legislation discussed below would provide
funds
to the states for the purpose of developing this type of natural
resource damage assessment plan.
39. Evidentiary devices such as this are already found in some federal and state
environmental laws. Thus, section 404 of the 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act apparently established a rebuttable presumption in favor of a
person claiming under the Fishermen's Contingency Fund (Title IV). Section 404
states, in part, that where tertain conditions are met, "there shall be a presumption
that such claim is valid ....
" Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 404, 92 Stat. 629 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1844). See
also Alessi, Wright & Treiber, Shifting the Burden of Proof in State Environmental
ProtectionActs: A Blessing to Environmental Plaintiffs, 8 ENVT'L L. REV. 851 (1978).
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ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES IN DAMAGE ASSESSMENT RULEMAKING

Available Institutional Mechanisms
As stated above, two important goals are to move the damage assessment baseline forward in time and reduce the range
of uncertainty. It is possible to identify several potential vehicles for achieving these objectives.
Strict Liability by Statute. A legislative body could pass
a new statute that would determine natural resource damage
in a more or less arbitrary way, along the lines of the Alaska
dollar-per-gallon law.40 This is a direct way to do things, but
what it gains in certainty it may well lose in fairness. Fundamentally, it constitutes a legislative shrug, a throwing up of the
hands and a basic lack of confidence in the ability of scientists
and economists to describe the complex reality of the environment.
Another shortcoming of the legislative fiat approach is
that it is rigid; once such legislation is passed, it may be difficult or impossible to obtain further legislation to correct, modify, or update a law. And significantly, legislative committee
hearings are probably not, as a general rule, suited to the development of the kind of detailed factual record that an administrative agency can develop using skilled staff. The job is, if not
classically one for delegation to an agency because it comes so
close to the traditional judicial role of fixing damages, at least
well suited to the procedural flexibility and technical expertise
for which such agencies have been turned to in the past.
Strict Liability by Contract. A second method would be to
impose damage assessment provisions by contract, for example, as a condition to a federal or state permit or lease. This
has been done in several contexts. 4 Even so, the contract route
for fixing damages in advance is not available in all cases and
binds only the parties to the contract. Another shortcoming is
the fact that such liability-without-fault provisions may be
imposed in an unfair way given the uneven bargaining power
of the parties, and may be no less arbitrary than the dollar-pergallon approach noted previously.
While the contract option may provide a way to reach the
party at fault, it does so in a manner that may be inflexible,
40. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758 (Supp. 1979).
41. See Fidell & Du Bey, Proposals for Reform in the Assessment of Oil Spill
Damages, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CONFERENCE
ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF OIL SPILLS § III(A)(2)(b) (June, 1978).
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scientifically unsupportable, and quite summary in practice.
Alternatively, if it is necessary to sue to enforce such an agreement, query whether the court will apply the sanction provision
in all cases or make its own assessment of the damages. If such
a contractual provision is to be sustained, it must be shown to
be not unreasonable. As one observer has put it,
[h]igh valuations which do not bear a reasonable relation
to a method of valuation are likely to be treated as penalties rather
liquidated damages. This approach may
simply pushthan
the problem of valuation back to a different
forum, but it may be effective in reducing the problem of
presenting evidence in individual cases and justifying
claims in settlement negotiations. [Emphasis added.]42
Rulemaking. Assuming that a rulemaking approach is preferable to a more rigid statutory approach, the scope of the
rulemaking program must be delineated. Here several general
approaches are possible. First, the proceeding could conclude
by issuing a regulation that provided a conventional dollar
value for particular natural resources. This figure could be
called a Federal Presumptive Value (FPV) which would directly govern the disposition of claims. Second, it could result
in issuance of federal regulations that would constitute a guideline for states or regional bodies for use in developing Natural
Resources Damage Assessment Plans (NARDAP's). This approach would provide more flexibility in principle, but it must
be recognized that a substantial amount of interstate or interregional diversity would be inevitable. A third approach would
be limited to predetermined standard research protocols. Some
combination of these three could also be considered.
A possible model for the development of a joint federalstate damage assessment scheme is the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. 41 Under this Act, a state may develop a
coastal zone management program. An analogous damage assessment scheme would consist of a state-developed NARDAP
prepared in conformity with federal criteria. Use of federal criteria would foster the development of uniform state approaches
to damage assessment while allowing for special concerns of the
state to be addressed. Moreover, damages assessed in accordance with a federally-approved NARDAP could be given prior42. Macbeth, Measure of Damages in Fishkill Cases, Envir. Cont. Newsletter
(Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen.), Nov. 8, 1974, at 14.
43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
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ity in "superfund" disbursements. It is important to note, however, that with this approach, some states may choose not to
prepare such a plan; moreover, even those that do choose to
develop a plan may not prepare an adequate one.
On the other hand, under the Clean Air Act," the federal
agency which administers the Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has the authority to promulgate a State
Implementation Plan (SIP) or portions of a SIP where the
state fails to develop an adequate one. Additionally, once a
state implements its plan as a matter of state law, it may be
submitted to EPA for approval as part of the SIP. Once approved, the SIP and any federally approved revision to the SIP
exists as a matter of state and federal law.45 Furthermore, the
provisions of the Clean Air Act may generally be enforced by
either the state or by EPA. Therefore, the Clean Air Act may
better illustrate how a state/federal NARDAP may be developed and implemented.4"
Whichever course is adopted, the resulting rule or standard could be made binding on administrative or judicial
decision-makers in cases of natural resource assessment, subject to adjustment for such factors as the Consumer Price
Index." This would help persuade interested parties to focus
their attention on the administrative proceedings. Those proceedings could be conducted before technically competent officials who would, with appropriate procedural safeguards, provide a more suitable forum for the resolution of generic natural
resource damage assessment issues than would a trial court. In
the event there was no applicable rule or standard that could
apply to a given type of natural resource damage assessment
problem, a claims-administration agency or court with jurisdiction could, under the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction,"
stay its hand until the matter had been referred to the proper
44. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Spec. Pamph. 1978).
45. The State Implementation Plan system remains quite flexible allowing the
governments to focus on specific problems on an ongoing basis, as evidenced by the
recent requirement that non-attainment areas revise their plans to reflect relevant
changes in air quality.
46. Such an approach is preferable to an approach legitimizing only voluntary
state programs, as exemplified by the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
47. See AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y, NORTH CENTRAL Div., MONETARY VALUES OF FISH
COMM., 1978 REIMBURSEMENT VALUES OF FISH 4 (1977), recommending that "[vialues
of fish should be increased in future by application of a multiplier such as the consumer
price index . . . when evaluating losses either from a pollution caused fish kill or when
negotiating compensation with competing water users."
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administrative agency and a rule or standard developed in that
context.
It is expected that such a proceeding would be challenged
as a deprivation of the right to a judicial determination of
damages or as a taking without just compensation or due process of law. However, such rules or standards would be subject
to judicial review on limited grounds such as arbitrariness or
lack of substantial evidence. Given the settled validity of measures such as the Federal Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act" or the workmen's compensation laws,
which involve the use of schedules setting specific payments for
particular injuries,49 a program along the lines outlined may
confidently be expected to pass constitutional muster if fair
rulemaking procedures are used and an adequate record is
established.
An Analogue for Damage Assessment Rulemaking: Workmen 's
Compensation
The establishment of presumptive values for the assessment of damage to natural resources is a concept that has not
yet been implemented by the federal government. However,
the federal government has been involved in establishing fixed
dollar valuation schemes in other areas for many years. One
federal program that bears a rough analogy to the concept of
natural resource valuation is workmen's compensation. Although the workmen's compensation program is widely accepted today, initially it was confronted by numerous challenges in the courts. Many of the legal objections to the workmen's compensation scheme may also confront a presumptive
valuation program for natural resources. It is important to
note, however, that workmen's compensation has overwhelmingly withstood attack in the courts. Surely if injuries as elusive
as pain and suffering or loss of consortium can be valued, or if
rigid rules can be applied in the loss-of-limb situation, one
must wonder whether our legal institutions can do a better job
of setting a value on injuries to natural resources.
One of the major objections to values established under
workmen's compensation laws was that actual damages were
48. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976). The schedule of disability compensation under
the Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act appears at 33 U.S.C. § 908
(1976).
49. See generally 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 58 (desk ed. 1972).
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not reflected and the individual's rights to a case-by-case determination of the value of his or her injury was not preserved.
This argument was rejected in New York Central Railroad v.
White, ' " where the Supreme Court recognized that it is often
too expensive and time-consuming to litigate each incident or
ascertain the facts necessary to make an accurate assessment
of damages. Thus, a fixed schedule of representative damages
arguably eliminates the possibility of determinations that are
arbitrary, biased, or based on inadequate information. In short,
workmen's compensation reached a middle ground by eliminating windfall recoveries at one end of the spectrum, and
inadequate recoveries due to an improperly presented claim at
the other.
A second major objection to the workmen's compensation
scheme of established damage schedules relates to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.' This objection manifests itself in two ways. First, it may be contended that limits
of damage as set by a schedule are a denial of due process in
that the right to present evidence is lost. Second, because workmen's compensation requires compulsory payment into a liability fund without regard to employer fault it could be characterized as a taking of property without due process of law.
The first due process argument can be overcome if the
right to present evidence is afforded during the rulemaking
proceeding. In rulemaking, an agency promulgates regulations
pursuant to a statutory delegation of authority in accordance
with the APA. Before rules can be promulgated, the APA generally requires that notice and opportunity to comment be
given to the public and interested parties." In some cases, a
public hearing may be held; in all but a few emergency or other
special cases, there must be a public comment period. The
agency then evaluates the evidence presented and decides
whether or not to adopt the rules. Unless the matter is committed by law to agency discretion, a term the Supreme Court has
strictly construed,53 this final decision by the agency is generally subject to judicial review by the courts." In order to with50.
51.

243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.

52. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
53. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The scope of judicial review of rulemaking is itself an
evolving matter, and there is evidence of a withdrawal by the courts from the more
intrusive forms of review that were once thought permissible. See Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 435 U.S. 519 (1978),
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stand judicial review, the agency's rulemaking action must not
have been arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion and,
where required, must be supported by substantial evidence.55
The fact that the presentation of evidence occurs before an
administrative agency rather than a court does not amount to
a denial of the right to present evidence. With all due respect,
administrative agencies are often more capable of making
value determinations and evaluating technical information
than the courts or Congress. Given the difficulty of ascertaining
actual damages, the evidence presented need not be precise to
be useful in helping to establish a damage value. Congress, or
an administrative agency through legislative delegation, may
provide for the payment of damages to injured parties in
amounts that reasonably approximate the probable damages.5"
Under one scheme for valuation of natural resources that
has been proposed in Congress,57 there exists an additional opportunity to present evidence which does not exist under the
workmen's compensation scheme. This opportunity would
arise in the context of an administrative or judicial challenge
to a specific damage claim associated with a spill event. The
workmen's compensation values are conclusive and therefore
evidence cannot be presented to counter the value set by the
schedule; the natural resource values could be presumptively
valid and thus could be challenged by either one or both of the
parties. If challenged, evidence can be presented to show that
the presumptive value is incorrect. Although the value established by rule is presumed to be correct until the party wishing
to set it aside presents evidence to the contrary, the opportunity exists to present evidence to overcome the presumption.
The second argument, that property is being taken without due process of law, is likely to be countered by the economic
contention that the party causing the damage may be in the
best position to accommodate the costs associated with the
activity. The problem with this response, however, is that pricing may not always be in the control of the entity responsible
for the spill. The spiller may or may not be in a position to
discussed in Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure:
A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978); 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
799 (1979). But see 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 605-16 (2d ed. 1978).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
56. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1931).
57. S. 2083, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(e)(1)-(2) (1977) (as amended).
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cover or pass along the costs associated with actual or prospective natural resource damage caused by the product. 8
The Supreme Court addressed similar due process issues
in the recent case of Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmental Study Group,59 where the Price-Anderson Act's limitation
of liability for nuclear accidents was held to be constitutional.
The statute had been challenged as a violation of due process
on the grounds that full recovery was not insured, that such a
substitute for common law remedies was unjust, and that equal
protection was being denied by the imposition of the burden of
nuclear accidents upon those living near the source rather than
on society as a whole. The Court rejected each of these arguments by emphasizing the rationality of Congress' choice of
means to achieve its purpose. The general rationality of the
Act's limitation of liability is based upon a balancing of the
interests of the prospective victims of a major accident against
society's need for new sources of energy. A Court which has so
held is likely to sustain a statute permitting promulgation of a
table of values for natural resources that might limit the recovery in the case of an oil or hazardous substance spill. However,
it is important to note the difference between simply putting a
ceiling on recovery and attaching a hard and fast price list to
recoveries, serving as both a ceiling and a floor at the same
time.
Federal presumptive values for natural resources could
provide benefits to the injured party comparable to the benefits
provided by workmen's compensation programs. The analogy
exists, however imperfectly, even though in one case the injured party is an individual and in the other case the injured
party may be a public body. Under such a scheme, compensation is provided where natural resource damage can be shown
and the difficulty of proving actual valuation on a case-by-case
basis is eliminated. This is especially important in instances
where available funds may be exhausted before the full costs
of the damage are known, much less paid. ° The benefit to the
party causing the damage is also analogous to workmen's compensation in that a ceiling is placed on the amount of recovery.
Compensation schemes are firmly established in the
58.
v. White,
(1916).
59.
60.

Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400 (1918); New York Central R.R.
243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
See id. at 85-94.
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framework of American law.' Establishing a fixed scheme to
place a fixed value upon natural resources for the purpose of
damage assessment would be one way to respond to the current
need for such a program. This program would provide a methodology for conducting the actual damage assessment that could
be utilized with a positive and definitive table of resource values.
Under the Clean Water Act of 1977, the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, and the proposed comprehensive oil spill liability act, the states and the federal government are charged with the responsibility of acting as trustees for natural resources. This new role demands resolution of
the uncertainty associated with resource valuation. With appropriate procedural safeguards, a presumptively accurate valuation scheme could provide a viable mechanism for accomplishing this goal.
Key Legal and Policy Concerns
There are at least five pivotal legal and policy concerns
that must be addressed in evaluating any program for the development of natural resources damage assessment along the
lines that have been suggested in the proposed national
scheme. These are: 1) the issue of preemption of state law; 2)
the evidentiary status of the values or methodologies selected;
3) the procedural rights to be afforded interested parties in any
rulemaking process; 4) the assignment of responsibility within
the federal government for development and implementation
of a rulemaking procedure; and 5) the scope and focus of the
valuation effort. Some general observations may be offered on
each of these areas.
Preemption. One of the most hotly-contested issues in recent environmental policy-making has been whether federal
legislation should be drafted to preempt the states from taking
action with respect to the subject matter of the particular legislation. The decided cases are perhaps somewhat difficult to
reconcile, but in general, the Supreme Court will find that the
states have not been preempted if there is an articulable basis
upon which to sustain the finding." The issue in any particular
61. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 2.50 (1978).
62. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1976). See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Hammond, 1978 A.M.C. 1697 (D. Alas. 1978) (appeal pending), noted in Kimball,
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instance is likely to turn on the expressed intent of Congress
or whether the state laws would frustrate the effectiveness of
the federal law.
Preemption is, of course, a means of achieving nationwide
uniformity. A strong case can be made for such uniformity in
the case of resource damage assessment to the extent that industries with nationwide impacts and activities may be involved, and to the extent that particular ecosystems may not
lend themselves to meaningful consideration according to the
arbitrary limits of state boundaries. The states may nonetheless be expected to object to any attempt to preempt their own
damage assessment policies and evidentiary rules. Even if formal preemption of state approaches to damage assessment
does not occur, however, federal guidance on the subject could
serve at least to encourage uniformity in much the same fashion as a model act does, to the extent that uniformity reduces
the level of uncertainty of liability; it would seemingly render
the potential liabilities more readily insurable.
Evidentiary Status of Rulemaking Results. Setting aside
the question whether the results of a federal damage assessment rulemaking would be subject to a rebuttable presumption
of accuracy, attention would have to be given to the use to
which those results could be put. Clearly Congress could provide for the use of such rules in proceedings before federal
agencies, but as one moves away from that type of forum, the
questions loom larger. Even after Crowell v. Benson, 3 some
might find it a violation of the separation of powers doctrine
to make such rules binding in actions in the federal courts.
Would it offend notions of our basic federalism to make such
rules binding in actions in the state courts? Furthermore, steps
should probably be taken to reflect such factors as improvements in our understanding of the biological and economic
aspects of natural resource damage, and the effects of inflation.
Presumably the door to the courthouse or the agency should be
left open to permit interested parties to raise such matters.
This is of particular importance in natural resource rulemaking
Preemption of State Laws-Alaska Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control
Act Held Invalid, 10 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 289 (1979).
63. 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (holding that no contravention of either the due process
or judicial power clauses results from conferring adjudicative power on an administrative agency, such as a workmen's compensation board, to decide whether an employer
is liable to his employee for injuries incurred in the employer's business as judicial
review provides adequate protections).
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given the dynamic nature of the data base upon which a rule
might be predicated.
Procedural Rights. Some account must be taken of the
need for the incorporation of changes in the data base underlying a damage assessment rule. The more fundamental question
is what kinds of procedures should be followed in establishing
such a rule in the first instance. This requires an assessment
of the types of issues of law, fact, and policy that must go into
any such rule, and the type of agency record that will be necessary in order to facilitate the measure of judicial review that is
deemed to be appropriate. In light of Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 4 unless
Congress otherwise specifies, an agency need only provide those
minimal notice -and-comment procedures prescribed in the
APA.
Since any streamlining of the damage assessment process
will entail new legislation, attention should be given to the
possible need for spelling out further procedural guarantees.
This is particularly so in light of the fact that the resulting rule
would have a direct impact on the recovery of damages, which
has traditionally been reserved for judicial determination. To
the extent, however, that there was flexibility at the trial stage,
for example, by ensuring that the presumption of the validity
of the rule was only rebuttable, and preserving the right of
parties to introduce evidence of their own on the question of
valuation, this could be viewed as a justification for permitting
less than full trial-type procedures during the rulemaking process. Where there are hotly contested matters raised in the
rulemaking, with clashing expert opinions, some crossexamination may be necessary, or it may be sufficient simply
to permit the parties to submit questions to the presiding officers. Because of the nature of the questions that are likely to
arise in such a rulemaking, a multi-member hearing board
could profitably be considered, modeled on the multi-disciplinary Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission." Attention could also be given
to the possibility of using an appeal board" for the purpose of
64. 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 799 (1979).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is apparently exploring the desirability of eliminating this intermediate step in its review of
licensing cases. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, RELEASE No. 78-240 (Nov. 3, 1978).
66. See generally Note, Intermediate Appellate Review Boards for Administrative Agencies, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1295 (1968).
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fostering uniformity of decisions among the trial level boards,
particularly if those trial boards were addressing damage assessment issued from a regional perspective.
Assignment of Agency Responsibility. Because of the present allocation of environmental responsibilities among a number of federal agencies, there is a considerable range of options
available as to who in the federal government should be given
the task of streamlining the damage assessment process. Candidate agencies include the EPA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS), the National Response Team (NRT), the Regional
Fishery Management Councils, the Council on Environmental
Quality, and the Water Resources Council.
Consider, for example, the possibility that the activity
that President Carter has directed the Water Resources Council to undertake could be the occasion for a broader reform of
decision-making methods and institutions in the damage assessment area. However, the Council's primary duties are the
evaluation of the impacts of federal projects. The core biological issues here may be similar, but the economic and public
policy issues in building a dam or some other expenditure of
public funds may not necessarily be wise, fair, or legal where
the disposition of private property is concerned. The Water
Resources Council is, therefore, not the proper body to perform
the function described above.
One alternative would be for the rulemaking to be implemented by the National Response Team (NRT), one of the
government's chief sources of biological expertise. Such expertise will be necessary if the damage assessment baseline is to
be moved forward. The NRT's concern is presently focused on
the coordination of oil and hazardous substance cleanup operations and it is not currently involved in rulemaking activities
of the sort described. It would be unfortunate if the NRT were
burdened with essentially regulatory tasks. It might in this
respect be better for an agency that already has rulemaking or
related functions to provide the forum for a damage assessment
and valuation rulemaking. This would allow the NRT, other
interested and qualified agencies of the government, the states,
and private parties to participate as full parties to the administrative proceedings.
The Regional Fishery Management Councils created
under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
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(FCMA)67 could be considered in this regard, either as parties
or conceivably as the rulemaking agency, to reflect the regional
dimension of marine natural resource damage assessment.
In enacting the FCMA, Congress found that the "fish off
the coasts of the United States . . . constitute valuable and

renewable natural resources. These fishery resources contribute
to the food supply, economy, and health of the Nation. .

..

""

findings,"9

Based on this and other
Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the United States for fishery management purposes.70 The FCMA asserts exclusive authority to manage all
forms of marine animal and plant life, other than marine mammals, birds, and highly migratory species within a 200-mile
Fishery Conservation Zone,7 ' and beyond, where the Continental Shelf extends seaward of the 200-mile zone or where anadromous fishes of United States origin may be found.7"
The FCMA establishes eight Regional Fishery Management Councils and charges them with the responsibility to develop fishery management plans designed to conserve and
manage these fishery resources.7 3 The Councils' tasks for conservation and management include, inter alia, the development measures taken to rebuild, restore, or maintain any fishery resource of the marine environment.7
The Fishery Management Councils established pursuant
to the FCMA75 are assigned the basic responsibility for preparation of a fishery management plan for each fishery within their
jurisdictions.76 These various plans must be prepared in a manner consistent with seven national standards.77 Certainly, in
order to properly carry out its management role, a council must
know the nature of the resource that it seeks to manage. The
expertise gained by the Council could readily be used for the
development of baseline damage assessment data. Moreover,
under the FCMA, the Councils have authority to "establish
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1822 (1976).
Id. § 1801(a)(2).
Id. § 1801(a)(5), (6).
Id. § 1811.
Id. §§ 1801(b)(1), 1802(1),(3),(4).

72. Id.
73.

Id. §§ 1852-1853.

74. Id. § 1802(2). See M. BEAN,
13 (1977).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a).
76. Id. § 1852(h)(1).
77. Id. § 1851(a).
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such other advisory panels as are necessary or appropriate to
assist it in carrying out its functions" under the Act."8 Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that there are limits to how
much can be asked of the Councils at present. As Congressman
Ruppe has stated, "[the available biological data on which
to base fishery management plans is inadequate and the development of a sufficient data base will require an extensive research program.""
Pursuant to guidelines issued by the Secretary of Commerce, 0 the Councils are directed to consider various "habitat
factors" in developing the fishery management plans.' It is
specifically noted that comprehensive fishery management will
have to address "the impact of pollution and the effects of
wetland and estuarine degradation upon . . . fish ...
.
"82
Another requirement of the guidelines is that the fishery management plans "[diescribe programs to protect or restore the
habitat of the stock(s) from destruction or degradation. ...
In expanding the scope of section 1321 of the Clean Water
Act (CWA), Congress stated that it is "the policy of the United
States that there should be no discharges of oil. . . which may
affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under
the exclusive management authority of the United States (including resources under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976)."1 This section of the CWA is clearly intended to protect from pollution by oil and hazardous substances the natural resources that had been previously claimed
by the United States under the FCMA. It may well be that the
FCMA can be utilized in conjunction with the CWA to provide
the natural resource protection envisioned by Congress in enacting the CWA.
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1852(g)(2).
79. 124 CONG. REC. H2629 (daily ed. April 10, 1978). The task of the Councils
may be analogized to damage assessment rulemaking as to the degree of scientific
certainty. Thus, 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (1976) calls for reliance on the "best scientific
information available," whereas the 1978 Senate bill discussed later in this article
contemplated use of the "best information available." See S. REP. No. 95-1152, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978).
80. 50 C.F.R. pt. 602 (1978). This guidance is consistent with the primary thrust
of the FCMA, which defines "conservation and management" as including all measures "required to rebuild, restore, or maintain . . . any fishery resource and the
marine environment." 16 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (1976).
81. 50 C.F.R. § 602.2(d)(3), 602.3(b)(6) (1978).
82. Id. § 602.2(d)(3).

83. Id. § 602.3(b)(6)(iii).
84.

33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1976).
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Thus, the Fishery Management Councils are in a position
to make an important contribution to the natural resource valuation process. The Councils should have both the expertise
and the practical management experience to participate in this
s5
valuation exercise.
The choice of implementing agency should be based on
considerations of expertise and efficiency. Only an agency that
already has a rulemaking function should have the key role in
damage assessment rulemaking. Additionally, it is probably
preferable that the authority be vested in a single agency,
rather than a consortium. This will reduce procedural wrangling and would leave open the possibility that those other
agencies could intervene in and offer their views on the record
in the proceeding conducted by the "lead" agency. Multiagency assignments, such as were envisioned in S. 2083, do not
appear to be desirable in the rulemaking context.
Scope and Focus of the Damage Assessment Process. Any
legislation addressed to reform of the resource damage assessment process should provide broad policy guidance but leave
the details to an expert agency. Whichever agency is given the
task of developing rules, it should be given a broad enough
mandate to exercise its best judgment as to whether a national
or regional focus is preferable. Congress, however, should provide a clear warrant as to the scope of the activity it intends
to see pursued.
Thus, if Federal Presumptive Values (FPV's) are within
Congress' expectation, this should be clearly stated. If, on the
other hand, the legislative sense is that broader guidelines such
as the National Resources Damage Assessment Plan (NARDAP) concept are more appropriate (e.g., if it is also contemplated that state natural resource damage assessment decisionmaking would be influenced in the process), then suitable limiting language should appear either in the legislation or legislative history. Congress may also, on the basis of its own hearings, conclude that preference should be given to an ecosystem
approach or a species-specific approach, as the case may be.
The basis for the congressional choice should in any event be
made clear in the legislative history.
85.

For an assessment of the effectiveness of the FCMA, see 7 NAT'L ADVISORY
& ATMOSPHERE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS app.
HI (June, 1978).
COMM'N ON OCEANS
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FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The history of federal involvement in the area of marine
environmental regulation provides a yardstick by which to assess the probable success of any proposed damage assessment
mechanism. Federal involvement was quite limited until relatively recently. Congress was, on the whole, content to defer to
the states in the area of environmental regulation. However, in
1969 the Stratton Commission Report 6 and in 1970 the National Estuarine Pollution Study" concluded that state action
alone was not enough and that federal participation was
needed. As a consequence, by the early 1970's, there was a rush
of activity in Congress resulting in the creation of a new body
of federal environmental law.8"
The major federal law considered below as a natural resource damage control measure is the Clean Water Act of 1977
(CWA). 8 In addition Senate bill 2083, a recent version of the
long-awaited "superfund" bill will be analyzed, as well as its
potential effectiveness as a natural resource valuation and
damage assessment mechanism.
The Clean Water Act of 1977
The Clean Water Act as an Oilspill Liability Scheme. The
CWA is the primary federal law governing spills of oil and
hazardous substances. In the Act, Congress declared it to be
the national policy that:
[T]here shall be no discharge of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone, or
in connection with activities under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act or the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, or
which may affect natural resources belonging to, apper86.

U.S.

COMM'N ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION

4, 56 (1969).
87. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,

AND THE SEA

THE NATIONAL ESTUARINE POLLUTION STUDY, S.

Doc. No. 58, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 368-69 (1970).
88. Among the various regulatory measures that comprise the body of federal oil
spill damage law are the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West

1978); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651-1655 (West
Supp. 1978); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§. 1501-1524 (1976); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1976), as amended by Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629.
89. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1978). See Hall,
Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 NAT. RESOURCE LAw. 343 (1978). See generally 3-4 SENATE
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT & PUB. WORKS, 95TH CONG,, 2d SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977 (1978).
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taining to, or under the exclusive management authority
of the United States (including resources under the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976). [Emphasis
added.] 0
Prior to the enactment of the 1977 amendments to the
CWA, the seaward reach of section 1321 was limited to the
contiguous zone, which reaches twelve nautical miles from the
coast. With the 1977 amendments, however, the United States
unilaterally extended its oil pollution control jurisdiction generally to 200 miles from the coast. Thus, the pollution control
zone is at least as extensive as the Fishery Conservation Zone
created by the FCMA.1'
Under the CWA,12 the President, acting through the
EPA, 3 has the task of determining which discharges of oil or
hazardous substances are "harmful," and for promulgating
regulations to this effect. The EPA has defined harmful quantities of oil as those which
(a) Violate applicable water quality standards, or
(b) Cause a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the
surface of the water or adjoining shorelines or cause a
sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath the surface of
the water or upon adjoining shorelines."
90. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(1) (West 1978).
91. Compare Charney, United States Interests in a Convention on the Law of the
Sea: The Case for Continued Efforts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39, 46 & n.14 (1978)
with Fidell, Developments in the Law: The Fishery Conservationand Management Act

of 1976, in

THE OCEAN CHALLENGE

214, 215 & nn.14-15 (Marine Tech. Soc'y & Inst. of

Elec. & Electronic Eng'rs eds. 1978) (suggesting that CWA jurisdiction exceeds 200
miles) and Bernhardt, The 1977 Clean Water Act Amendments-Conflicts and
Contradictions,12 MARINE TECH. Soc'Y J. 28, 28 & n.5 (1978) (citing CWA § 311(b)(1)).
The CWA was further amended in 1978. Act of Dec. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-576, 92
Stat. 2467.
92. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(3)-(4) (West 1978).
93. Exec. Order No. 11,735, 38 Fed. Reg. 21,243 (1973), reprinted in 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1321 app., at 183 (West 1978).
94. 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (1978). A visible sheen is informally defined as 10-20 ppm
of oil. NAT'L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MARINE POLLUTION MONITORING (PETROLEUM) 36 (NBS Special Pub. No. 409) (1974). See also 43 Fed. Reg.
10,474-10,488 (1978), where in accordance with section 1321(b)(2)(A) of the CWA, the
Administrator of EPA promulgated final rules that designated as hazardous substances a number of elements and compounds. When discharged, these materials are
deemed to present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.
Examples of this danger include injury to fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and
beaches. Not all discharges of oil are covered by the Act; there are two areas specifically exempted. The first area includes discharges "into the waters of the contiguous
zone . . . where permitted under the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)(A) (1976). The second covers
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The CWA establishes a liability scheme for oil and hazardous material discharges that violate the Act. The discharger is
strictly liable for a limited amount for the actual cost of
cleanup incurred by the United States. 5 It is important to note
that the cost Of removal includes any costs or expenses incurred
by the federal or any state government in the restoration or
replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a
result of the discharge.
Section 1321 requires the President to prepare and publish
a National Contingency Plan providing for the removal of
spilled oil and hazardous material. The purpose of the plan is
to "provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to
minimize damage from oil and hazardous substances discharges."9 The plan is to be implemented whenever a spill
occurs unless the President determines that the party responsible for the discharge is capable of properly removing it. The
President is directed to give the National Contingency Plan the
force of law by issuing "regulations consistent with maritime
safety and navigation laws.""8 The CWA also provides for civil
penalties in the event that a party fails to comply with regulations promulgated thereunder."
By executive order, the President delegated the responsibility for the National Contingency Plan to the Council on En0 The National Contingency Plan has
vironmental Quality.'1
been completed,'"' and a number of Regional Contingency
Plans have been prepared to provide for its implementation.
Significantly, under the National Plan, EPA is charged with
the task of providing expertise in damage assessment resulting from a spill.'0 The relevant section, entitled "Federal redischarges which are "permitted in quantities and at times and locations or under such
circumstances or conditions as the President may, by regulation determine not be
harmful." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)(B) (1976).
95. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(b)(6) (West 1978). Vessel liability under § 1321 of the
CWA has been held to be subject to the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181189 (1958). Complaint of Steuart Transportation Co., 435 F. Supp. 789, 805 (E.D. Va.
1977) aff'd, 12 E.R.C. 2035 (4th Cir. 1979).
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (1976).
97. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(c)(2) (West 1978).
98. Id. § 1321(j)(1) (West 1978).
99. Id. § 1321(j)(1)-(2) (West 1978).
100. Exec. Order No. 11735, 38 Fed. Reg. 21,243 (1973), reprinted in 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1321 app., at 183 (West 1978).
101. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1510.1-.54 (1977). The National Plan is being revised to make
it consistent with recent statutory changes.
102. Id. § 1510.22(1).
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sponsibility," states in part that "[t]he Environmental Protection Agency, through the Office of Water and Hazardous
Materials, provides expertise regarding environmental effects
of pollution discharges and environmental pollution control
techniques, including assessment of damages.' 1' 3
In February, 1977, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations held hearings to review the National Contingency Plan. 104 At these hearings, it became apparent that the assessment of damages resulting from spills was a
major weakness of the National Plan. 05
One major cause of this shortcoming is funding, as neither
the CWA nor the National Plan allows federal agencies to recover costs for damage assessments conducted as a result of
spills.'"' At the 1977 hearing, Dr. Robert M. White, the former
Administrator of NOAA, expressed his concern that pre-spill
damage assessments should be prepared to reduce impacts
from oil spills in areas crucial to the survival of fishery re107
sources.
Both the pre- and post-spill biological assessments are
important from a legal viewpoint. As to the cost of such studies,
one possible solution would be that the spiller bear a fair portion of the financial burden. It can always be argued that the
spiller is responsible for the post-spill "information costs"'' 0
103. Id.
104. OilspilU Contingency Plan: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (statement of Dr. Robert M.
White), 57 (letter from Rep. Leo J. Ryan to Elmer B. Staats, Compt. Gen.), 288 (EPA
Office of Legislation reponse to questions from the House Gov't Operations Subcomm.)
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Oilspill Contingency Plan Hearings].
105. Id.
106. The only federal law that provides funds for damage assessment purposes
is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978; section 302(c)(2)
makes the fund established under Title 111 of the Act available for this purpose. Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 302(c)(2),
92 Stat. 629 (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1812).
107. Oilspill Contingency Plan Hearings,supra note 104, at 37 (statement of Dr.
Robert M. White).
108. These "information costs" can be enormous. For an estimate of the long
range study costs said to be associated with a single major spill, see P. Sorensen,
Preliminary Report: Economic Evaluation of Environmental Damage Resulting from
the Santa Barbara Oil Spill 5, 18-24 (July, 1974) (submitted to Cal. Dep't of Justice).
The potential scope of the damage assessment process may be seen in a 1978 Senate
report, which recites that "[rlesearch efforts should include, but not be limited to,
development of ways to assess (1) long term damage to ecosystems, (2) chronic effects
such as those affecting behavior, reproduction, or food supply that result in indirect
losses, (3) predictive capabilities to determine potential losses through trophic interactions, and (4) information on minimizing the damage caused by spill control, dispersal,
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which relate to the assessment of the damage caused by the
spill if liability is shown. Suppose there is a spill but the research reveals no lasting adverse impacts. It is probably unfair
to require the spiller to pay for research if it has asserted that
no lasting effects will be felt. This approach may also present
a legal problem to the extent that it involves the taxing of one
party for an activity that is in reality of general benefit to the
public.'" Additionally, the taxation of research costs could be
subject to abuse and come to be viewed as a means of funding
projects for which there is little need.
The Natural Resource Damage Provisions of the Clean
Water Act.Although there has been a long history of federal
water pollution control legislation in the United States, the
problem of natural resource damages was not directly addressed until enactment of the 1977 CWA. In particular, section 1321 of the CWA now embraces natural resource damage
within the scope of oil and hazardous substance spill cleanup
costs. Prior to the passage of the CWA, a spiller's liability was
limited to the costs actually incurred by the federal government in removing the oil." ' Such removal is defined by the
CWA as the "removal of the oil. . . from the water and shorelines or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary
to minimize or mitigate damages to the public health or welfare."'
One new subsection of the Clean Water Act could set the
stage for a major new phase in the development of federal
environmental law, 2 and for this reason it should be examined
with care. This provision states that
[t]he costs of removal of oil or a hazardous substance for
and cleanup operations." S. REP. No. 95-1152, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978). Any one
of these elements of the information-gathering process could in many cases easily
exceed the non-informational costs associated with remedying the effects of the pollution.
109. See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974);
Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974) (concerning
administrative agency licensing fees).
110. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(f)(1)-(2) (West 1978).
111. Id. § 1321(a)(8).
112. Id. § 1321(f)(4) (West 1978) builds on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976); 30 C.F.R. § 250.43 (1977); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (1975); 43 C.F.R. § 29.1(d) (1978); and Deepwater Port
Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1517 (1976). In particular, see § 1517(i)(3) of the Deepwater
Port Act. Comparable restoration and replacement provisions were provided by the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, §
303(b)(3), 92 Stat. 629.
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which the owner or operator of a vessel or onshore or offshore facility is liable. . . shall include any costs or expenses incurred by the Federal government in the restoration
or replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed
as a result of a discharge of oil or a hazardous substance
in violation of this section. [Emphasis added.]"'
Another new subsection mandates that the President or an
authorized state representative "act on behalf of the public as
trustee of the natural resources to recover for the costs of replacing or restoring such resources.""' 4 The legislative intent
behind the adoption of these subsections is set out in the conference report. The report, in explaining the liability associated
with these new provisions, stated that:
For those resources which can be restored or rehabilitated,
the measure of liability is the reasonable costs actually
incurred by Federal or State authorities in replacing the
resources or otherwise mitigating the damage. Where the
damaged or destroyed resource is irreplaceable (as an endangered species or an entire fishery), the measure of liability is the reasonable cost of acquiringresources to offset
the loss. [Emphasis added.]" 5
Perhaps the most interesting language in this subsection
arises from the congressional mandate that "[slums recovered
shall be used to restore, rehabilitate,or acquire the equivalent
of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of the
Federal government or the state government.""' [Emphasis
added.]
The procedural sequence triggered by this provision of the
Act provides a key to making a natural resource damage provision work. However, it is unclear whether the trustee of the
natural resources must first assess or expend monies to restore
or replace the natural resource damage caused by the spill
before the trustee may add these costs to the overall government claim for "costs of removal" assessed against the
spiller." 7 The matter is further complicated by the fact that the
cost associated with natural resource damage is not available
113. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(0(4) (West 1978).
114. Id. § 1321(f)(5).
115. H.R. REP. No. 95-830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 92, reprinted in [19771 U.S.
CODE CoNc. & AD. NEWS 4424, 4467.

116.
117.

Id.
33 U.S.C.A. § 1321(f)(4) (West 1978).
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from the revolving fund established by the Act."' A potential
result is that the environment can be restored only after the
government claimant has prevailed in court and the spiller has
paid the money damages awarded." '
These new provisions in the Clean Water Act must be
evaluated in a broader context. There remains the basic question whether there is adequate information presently available
to implement the restoration and replacement provisions of the
Act. Moreover, natural resource damage by oil spill is only a
part of a larger picture: hazardous or toxic substances could
pose substantially more difficult natural resource damage
questions.
Even if the first question of fixing liability is behind us, the
problem of placing monetary value on the natural resources
damaged by the spill must be addressed. An analysis of Senate
bill 2083 is set forth below in order to illustrate how it might
alter the existing body of federal natural resource law.
The 1978 Senate Superfund Bill
On August 25, 1978, Senate bill 2083, entitled the "Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1978," was reported out of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.'2 ° The bill built upon the framework of section 1321
of the CWA and must be viewed in conjunction with the CWA.
The bill passed the Senate as H.R. 6803 but died in the House
during the final days of the 95th Congress.' 2 ' A similar
"superfund" bill, Senate bill 684, is receiving congressional
22
attention in the 96th Congress.'
Of importance is section 5 of S.2083, regarding use of the
oil spill liability fund. This section was added in the final committee markup sessions, and contained key language concern118. Id. § 1321(k).
119. Id. § 1321(f)(5). Maine has attempted to solve this sort of problem by
imposing fees upon oil terminal operators to support funds used for cleanup and compensation purposes. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 541 (West 1978).
120. S. REP. No. 95-1152, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978).
121. In September, 1977, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation reported and referred by unanimous consent the original S.2083 to the
Committee on Environment and Public Works. Thereafter Senator Muskie introduced
S. 2900 as a proposed amendment to the original S. 2083. When the measure was
reported out, the original language of S. 2083 was stricken and the bill was amended
by the addition of S. 2900; thus, S. 2900 became S. 2083. Thereafter, the Senate
incorporated S. 2083 into H.R. 6803 and sent it to the House.
122. S. 684, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S2882 (daily ed. March 15,
1979).
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ing natural resource valuation and damage assessment. Important to note here are the facts that 1) cleanup costs and damages would include the loss of natural resources, and 2) liability
fund monies could be appropriated for spill-related research as
well as other administrative costs. The following analysis reviews this proposed legislation solely as a national resource
valuation and damage assessment measure; the liability and
other aspects of the bill are beyond the scope of the present
inquiry and will not be discussed.
A stated purpose of the bill was to "preserve the public
trust in the Nation's natural resources."'' 3 Thus, S. 2083 would
have established a strict liability scheme without regard to the
fault of the spiller for damage to natural resources.' 24 Under the
proposed scheme, the federal and state governments were designated trustees of the natural resources within their respective
jurisdictions and could recover for damages to the natural resources so held in trust. Although such a recovery would be
stated in terms of dollars, S. 2083 did not limit legal damage
to the costs associated with restoration or replacement of damaged resources.
Under the 1978 Senate bill, the President would have been
charged with administration of the liability fund, the establishment of a claims procedure, and the payment of monies from
the fund.'2 5 A specific provision of the bill authorized the President to delegate his responsibilities to the appropriate administrative agencies. In its report, the committee specifically set
out two principles to guide the delegation of his powers. The
two principles are:
(1) to the extent practicable fragmentation in the administration of this act is to be avoided; and
(2) where appropriate, consistent with the avoidance of
123. S. REP. No. 95-1152, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1978).
124. This approach has been adopted by several states. See, e.g., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 238, 270 P.2d 952 (1928) (drilling mishaps on land);
Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350
A.2d 520 (1975); Florida Pollution Spill Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 376.011 (West 1974); Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 541 (West 1978); Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 90.48 (Supp. 1977). See Bergman, supra, note 4, at 1 (1973). See also Union Oil

Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974) (reserving the question of strict
liability).
125. The committee report indicated that the claims procedure should be developed in accordance with the relevant provisions of H.R. 6803 entitled "Domestic Oil
Pollution Liability, Compensation and Fund." S. REP. No. 95-1152, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1978).
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fragmentation; the experience and pattern of responsibility developed in the National Contingency Plan under section . . . (1321) of the Clean Water Act should be used.2"
This guidance is consistent with the rulemaking approach discussed above.
The fund established by S. 2083 would have been available
to pay the removal costs of the federal or state government, as
well as any other party performing authorized removal functions under the National Contingency Plan. More importantly,
the fund would also have been available to pay the costs of
research, and the costs of establishing and maintaining such
damage assessment capability in accordance with the government's responsibility under that plan. Further, money would
be available from the fund to pay the costs of assessing damage
to natural resources. Finally, the fund would pay the costs of
the federal and state governments in restoring or replacing natural resources damaged or destroyed as a result of a spill.
Senate bill 2083's major innovation regarding damage assessment was found in section 5(e). Under this provision, a
number of tasks would be shared by the federal agencies that
presently have management and protection responsibility over
natural resources. The named agencies are EPA, the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). These three agencies would be
given responsibility for standardizing a process for assessing
the damages to aquatic resources caused by spills of oil or
hazardous materials. The committee envisioned this task as
being carried out through rulemaking after a comprehensive
review of alternative damage assessments schemes. Moreover,
the committee stated that the review of alternative schemes
would "focus scientific debate concerning damage assessment
on the rulemaking process and result in a decision regarding
the best simplified procedures for making accurate and defen7
sible assessments of (natural resources) damages in spills."',
The procedures contemplated under section 5(e) for natural resources damage assessment were intended to provide a
mechanism for fixing a dollar value to resource damages with
a minimum of administrative cost. The committee report refers
to this aspect of damage assessment as a "balancing ap126.
127.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 25.
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proach." 2 How the drafters expected this approach to be carried out is unclear. It appears that the size of the spill would
trigger the type of assessment that is conducted. Thus, a spill
would be characterized as "minor" if it was less than 10,000
gallons of oil or where it did not cause significant natural resource damage. This may well result in the assignment of dollar
values to specific representative bio-systems on a valuation12
per-specific-volume basis.

Though confusing, in general the valuation scheme envisioned by the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee in 1978 would permit a range of valuation approaches.
At one end of the spectrum is a more simple form of damage
assessment that would be designed to minimize the need for
field work associated with a spill event. The assessment techniques employed in this instance would be a combination of
generalized habitat values, species values, and other associated
methods.
At the other end of the spectrum are the assessment procedures that come into play when a spill is not minor and the
natural resource damage is substantial. In the case of major
damage, the need for prompt field work is evident and the cost
of carrying out the assessment increased proportionally. The
rulemaking carried out under section 5(e) would serve to establish a range of assessment procedures and protocols that could
be employed depending on the size of the spill.
Under the 1978 Senate bill, the rulemaking process would
be a joint effort of the three federal agencies noted above in
cooperation with the affected state governments. The committee expressed the desire that hearings concerning the rulemaking under section 5(e) be as flexible as possible and conducted
on a regional rather than state-by-state basis.3 0 The advantages of such a regional approach are obvious and become a
necessity in light of the short two-year period provided in the
bill for the issuance of initial regulations. 3 ' It is also apparent
that there is a need to provide an adequate forum so that free
and open scientific dialogue could be developed to support the
rulemaking.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 25.
Id.
For illustrations of the problems associated with such short statutory time-

tables, see E.I. duPont de Nemours Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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As noted, S. 2083 would have required that the initial rulemaking be completed within two years with a comprehensive
review and update every two years thereafter. When the appropriate damage assessment protocols are followed, the natural
resource damage assessment valuation would be given the evidentiary status of a rebuttable presumption. Thus, the spiller
would have to shoulder the burden of proof in contesting the
dollar amount of the government's damage assessment case.
Senate bill 2083 specified that the damage assessment regulatory package should consist of two major programs. The
first would be "standardproceduresfor simplified assessments
requiring minimal field observation, including establishing
measures of damages based on units of discharge of units of
affected area. "132 The committee report indicates that this aspect of the rulemaking framework is to be applied to "minor"
spills of oil and hazardous materials which would include oil
spills under 10,000 gallons. The committee report goes on to
state that
Natural resource damage assessments based on this type
of regulation should require as little field work as possible,
and rely on a combination of habitat values, tables of values for individual species, and previously conducted surveys and laboratorystudies related to units33 of discharge or
units of affected area. [Emphasis added.]'
The second major aspect of the rulemaking scheme provides
that the program is to specify "alternative protocols for conducting assessments in individual cases to determine the type
and extent of short and long term injury, destruction, or loss
(of natural resources).' 34 The regulations developed under this
subpart would be utilized in large or unusually damaging spills
for site specific damage assessment activities. As stated in the
committee report, the primary focus of this program is twofold:
first, to contain protocols for field assessments of short and
for
long-term damage, and second, to develop methodologies
3
1
resources.
damaged
the
of
determining the value
The committee report is quite specific as to the type of
information the proposed rulemaking would provide. For ex132. S. 2083, § 5(e)(1)(B)(i), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (as amended) (emphasis
added).
133. S. REP. No. 95-1152, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978).
134. S. 2083, § 5(e)(1)(B)(ii), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (as amended).
135. S. REP. No. 95-1152, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978).
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ample, the following areas of concern were to be addressed by
the rulemaking:
1. Protocols for field assessments:
A. Uniform instructions for cost-effective site investigation;
B. Sampling and statistical procedure;
C. Methodology for determining the geographical
extent of damage.
2. Application of the Protocols to:
A. Coastal estuaries;
B. Open water;
C. Freshwater rivers;
C. Lakes; and
13
D. Wetlands.
The report also suggested that the classification system of the
national wetlands inventory be used to the extent practicable
in developing these protocols.
Regulations promulgated under this provision could establish procedures for assessing the value of both the direct loss
of organisms and their habitat and the indirect loss of organisms and habitat. Whether both types of injury should be included is an open and difficult issue, as inclusion of indirect
effects could serve to remove any meaningful ceiling. Public
debate on this issue is essential.
Under the scheme proposed by the Senate in 1978, three
major federal environmental agencies - EPA, NOAA, and
FWS - would be given substantial new responsibility. These
agencies would share the jobs of conducting resource damage
assessment and of providing expert testimony when damage
claims were brought by the United States. The damage assessment function would have been divided in the following manner: EPA would be responsible for freshwater and estuarine
resources landward of the baseline of the territorial sea; NOAA
would be responsible for marine resources; and FWS would be
responsible for living resources and their supporting ecosystems. These arrangements would, to be sure, have to be altered
if and when the administration presents a reorganization plan
for either environmental or oceans programs.
As a national program, S. 2083 placed primary responsibility at the federal level but allowed federal resources to supple136.
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ment state initiatives. Upon the request of a state governor
where the state is a "public trustee" plaintiff, NOAA, EPA, or
FWS would be available to conduct assessments and bring
natural resource damage claims on behalf of the state. Consistent with the federal guidelines, a state could as a trustee assert
claims itself under S. 2083. However, the state would have to
carry out its assessment effort in accordance with regulations
37
to be promulgated under section 5(e).' This approach would
be in harmony with the NARDAP concept discussed above.
CONCLUSION

A key period in the evolution of natural resource damage
assessment policy is currently taking place. The decision in
The Zoe Colocotroni, together with Senate passage of a bill
that would have established a comprehensive federal rulemaking procedure for damage assessment valuation decisions,
squarely poses the policy questions that are identified in this
article. The choice, it would seem, is one of steering in the wake
of The Zoe Colocotroni or continuing along the course suggested by S. 2083. Either approach has shortcomings. It is
questionable whether it is proper, in the broadest sense, for
generic environmental issues such as the valuation question to
be decided in the framework of an isolated civil action where
an evidentiary default by one party may have wide-ranging
implications for others. On the other hand, the damage assessment provision of the Senate bill proceeded to the verge of
enactment without congressional hearings of any kind on that
provision, much less debate on the floor.
This article has sought to demonstrate the seriousness of
the legal and scientific issues that inhere in the policy decision
that will shortly be made. Whatever view may be taken of the
merits of the available choices, action should not be taken
without a full exploration of the issues in plenary congressional
hearings. It is therefore appropriate that all participants in the
legislative process, and all those whose training give them an
interest, make their views known. It is the authors' intent that
this article serve as a springboard for further analysis of the
pressing issues of public policy now before the courts and Congress.
137. The National Contingency Plan could be an appropriate vehicle for presenting damage assessment and natural resource valuation information. The National Plan
and each Regional Plan could readily accommodate an appendix for Damage Assessment Protocols and another for natural resource valuation guidance.

